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Abstract: 
This empirical application investigates the eventual presence of credit constraints using a 
panel of French farmers. This is the first European application using a direct modelling approach 
based upon axiomatic production theory. The credit constrained profit maximisation model 
proposed by Färe, Grosskopf and Lee is extended in three ways. First, we rephrase the model in 
terms of directional distance functions to allow for duality with the profit function. Second, we 
model the presence of credit constraints in the short-run and investment constraints in the long-
run using short- respectively long-run profit functions. Third, we lag the expenditure constraint 
one year to account for the separation between planning and production. We find empirical 
evidence of both credit and investment constraints, though their relative impact on the degree of 
financial inefficiency is rather low in the short-run. Financially unconstrained farmers are larger, 
perform better, and seem to benefit from a virtuous circle where access to financial markets 
allows better productive choices. In the long-run, almost all farms seem to suffer from credit 
constraints for financing their investments. 
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1Introduction 
Production theory and finance have for a long time developed along separate paths as if 
production and financial decisions and their associated risks could be neatly separated. Only few 
production models have managed to directly integrate financing issues and risk (e.g., Hughes). 
For instance, the production of banking services has recently been analysed not only in terms of 
profits but also in terms of risk preferences, the latter allowing to trade off profit for reduced risk 
(e.g., Hughes et al.). One issue that did receive some attention is the impact of credit constraints 
on production. It is meanwhile common knowledge that the presence of informational 
asymmetry and incentive compatibility problems lead to capital market imperfections such that 
external financing is more costly than internal financing. The premium tends to be inversely 
related to the borrower’s net worth (see Hubbard; Schiantarelli). In the empirical literature on 
credit rationing in finance, we are not aware of any study including farming when studying the 
structure of the commercial loan market (see, e.g., the survey of Valentini). This is probably 
because most studies focus on companies listed on the stock market.  
The problem of credit constraints and rationing is severe in agriculture for various well-
known reasons: (i) there is a substantial lag between purchasing inputs and selling outputs, (ii) 
farm-specific capital is inflexible, (iii) the direct link between private wealth and farm capital 
limits the possibilities for providing collateral, (iv) most farms are relatively small in size, etc. 
Some of these characteristics are rather common among the smaller enterprises. Of course, the 
problem is even worse in less developed countries’ agriculture, since these farmers have less 
collateral under the form of land. The access to external financing resources (mostly debt and 
leasing) being limited, farmers’ operations and investments heavily depend on internal financing 
(Barry and Robison).  
This contribution aims to directly test for the presence and impact of credit rationing in 
agricultural production using nonparametric specifications of traditional and expenditure 
constrained profit functions on a panel of French farmers in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region 
during the years 1994-2001. Indeed, the differences between profit functions with and without a 
credit constraint yield a measure of the opportunity cost of lack of credit access (Färe, 
Grosskopf and Lee; Lee and Chambers). With the exception of the few papers cited below, we 
are unaware of European studies using this approach.  
This modelling strategy is particularly attractive, since the issue of distinguishing 
between subsets of constrained and unconstrained units is endogenously determined (in contrast 
to most of the traditional literature: Schiantarelli). By specifying the credit constraint in terms of 
2current expenditures, a sum of internal and external financing resources, one can directly verify 
whether units are eventually constrained in reaching the profit maximising input and output mix. 
Farms that are relatively large compared to the profit maximising optimal combination will 
never appear as credit constrained, since they can always adjust their inputs and outputs 
downward. But, the relatively smaller units may reveal the presence of credit constraints: when 
the latter constraint is binding, then the deviation between observed and optimal profits is 
(partly) attributable to credit constraints. This approach can be interpreted as an attempt to 
model Kornai’s statement that firms do not maximise profits subject to a technological 
constraint solely, but always face a budget constraint.
1 Without entering into detail (see also 
below), our approach has the advantage to allow statements about potential profits lost due to 
credit constraints (this is impossible in certain other approaches (e.g. Euler equation 
estimation)), though one should admit it has also some limitations (no account of uncertainty or 
farm household preferences, potential identification problems, etc.). 
The presence of credit constraints in agriculture using a similar modelling framework has 
so far only been directly considered for the USA and India. In particular, Lee and Chambers 
study the presence of credit constraints in U.S. agriculture using an expenditure constrained 
profit function at the aggregate level for the years 1947-1980. They find compelling evidence 
that farmers face binding credit constraints. Tauer and Kaiser find some evidence of a 
downward sloping supply curve for New York dairy farmers compatible with a profit 
maximisation model with binding cash flow constraints. For a rather small sample of 
Californian rice farmers, Färe, Grosskopf and Lee discover that credit constraints bind for only 
about 20% of the sample. Whittaker and Morehart analyse a small sample of midwestern grain 
farms in the USA and find 12% of these constrained by their assets and about an equal amount 
constrained by their debts. Finally, Bhattacharya, Bhattacharya and Kumbhakar report for a small 
sample of individual jute growers in West Bengal substantial output losses and input 
misallocations due to the presence of expenditure constraints. 
From a policy viewpoint, our benchmarking approach is useful because efficiency 
measures are reliable predictors of potential financial problems and eventual bankruptcy (Pille 
and Paradi). Moreover, a better understanding of the extent and impact of credit constraints 
could contribute to refine current agricultural policy instruments and eventually to enlarge the 
                                                           
1 Since it is an institutionally defined constraint, Kornai distinguishes soft and hard budget constraints as extremes 
in a spectrum. He focuses on soft budget constraints in the socialist planning context and sees state paternalism 
(direct subsidies, interenterprise arrears, tax arrears, etc.) as a cause of the softening of the budget constraint. By 
contrast, firms in market economies face hard budget constraints, because of the risk of failure and credit rationing. 
For an overview of this literature in transition economies: see Schaffer. 
3range of instruments available for regulating the sector. To this purpose, the article employs a 
Tobit analysis to investigate the determinants of the observed heterogeneity in measured 
efficiency results. Such knowledge is valuable for European policies in times of trade 
liberalisation and unstable agricultural markets. 
 
Productive and Financial Performance Measures Based on Profit Frontiers: Methodology 
Profit Frontiers and Credit Constraints: Basic Intuitions 
Essentially, this article rephrases the basic approach developed in Färe, Grosskopf and Lee 
(henceforth FGL) who estimate both a profit function with an expenditure-constraint and 
another one without and test the impact of financial rationing in agriculture by the gap between 
both profit functions. Furthermore, we extend their article by distinguishing between the 
presence of credit constraints in both the short- and long-run to differentiate between credit 
rationing related to operational expenses and investments. Finally, while FGL employ cross-
section data, the availability of panel data allows experimenting with lagged expenditure 
constraints to model the time gap between production decisions (sowing, fertiliser, pesticides, 
…) and the harvesting of crops at the end of the production cycle. Some parts of the earlier 
planning may be revised when necessary due to certain contingencies. Therefore, there may well 
be a divergence between planned and actual budgets, the difference being attributed to planning 
adjustments. 
An important feature of FGL and our own developments is that use is made of an 
axiomatically founded production model and that one distinguishes between the production 
possibility set and its boundary. Indeed, the estimation of production frontiers via parametric or 
nonparametric specifications of technology and economic value functions has recently become a 
standard empirical methodology (Färe and Primont). This literature yields well-founded 
measures of economic performance and operationalises the basic distinction between technical 
and allocative efficiencies. Technical efficiency requires production on the technology 
boundary; technical inefficiency occurs when production deviates from the frontier. Technical 
efficiency thus only guarantees reaching a point on the production frontier, not necessarily a 
point on the frontier maximising, e.g., the profit function. Allocative efficiency, by contrast, 
measures the adjustments in input and output mixes along the production frontier needed to 
achieve the maximum of, e.g., the profit function given relative prices. Hence, allocative 
efficiency presumes the absence of technical inefficiency and verifies simply whether for given 
prices one manages to achieve the optimal value of the objective function or not. For instance, 
4when production units are situated on the production frontier and assumed to maximise profits, 
allocative inefficiency results whenever the producer’s profits fall short from the maximum. 
In reality, the farmer’s choices are not only constrained by the technology, but also by 
additional constraints. Among the most important constraints are regulatory constraints linked to 
the CAP (e.g., land set-aside provisions), environmental constraints, and credit constraints 
associated with capital market imperfections.
2 In our modelling strategy we focus on credit 
constraints and ignore all eventual other constraints. The reason is that most of these constraints 
apply to all farmers and, furthermore, that no major regulatory changes occurred during the 
period covered. By contrast, one can expect that not all farmers are equally affected by the 
existence of credit constraints. If maximal profits in a model with a credit constraint is lower 
than maximal profits in the basic model, then this can be interpreted as allocative inefficiency 
relative to the basic profit function. Since agriculture is a sector where planning and production 
phases are separated by time lags, optimal profits in t are constrained by the level of the credit 
constraint observed in t-1. This special form of allocative inefficiency due to the presence of a 
credit constraint can be called financial inefficiency.  
We briefly illustrate the logic of this modelling approach with the help of figure 1. For 
simplicity, we focus on the long-run analysis and abstract from the time lag. Assume 4 
observations on the production frontier F. For given input and output prices observation  c 
maximises profits at the level Πc. Consider now two sub-optimal observations: one to the left (e) 
and another one to the right (f) of point c. Both these observations are technically efficient, but 
allocatively inefficient compared to observation c. The question is now whether we can unveil 
any reason for these observed allocative inefficiencies. 
Unit e has expenditures Ee that effectively prevent the unit from increasing its inputs and 
expanding its outputs to behave like observation c. Unit e is financially inefficient, because the 
binding expenditure constraint (representing both internal and external financing) potentially 
explains why it fails to mimic observation c and suffers from a profit gap. Henceforth, its 
allocative inefficiency may be due to financial reasons. Things are different for unit f. Point f has 
expenditures  Ef, but these expenditures do not constrain the unit in terms of its presumed 
objective of profit maximisation, since it could always reduce its inputs and outputs to mimic 
observation c. Consequently, it is financially efficient. Its allocative inefficiency must be due to 
other reasons (e.g., lack of managerial skills).  
                                                           
2 E.g., Ball et al. and Moro and Sckokai explicitly model land set-aside requirements in a profit function 
framework. 
5The same basic story applies to observations g and h, but these are also technical 
inefficient. For instance, in the case of unit g the gap between optimal (Πc) and observed profits 
(Πg) is decomposed into (i) the difference between the expenditure-constrained (ECΠg) and 
observed (Πg) profits that measures technical inefficiency, and (ii) the gap between optimal (Πc) 
and expenditure-constrained (ECΠg) profits that evaluates financial inefficiency. The same story 
told for unit f applies for unit h, except that it is also technically inefficient. 
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Of course, the specification of the credit constraint is crucial in all this. Ideally, one 
would like to know all sources of financing, both internally (revenues and other family income) 
and externally (bank loans, leasing and other credit (e.g., suppliers)). Unfortunately, this 
information is rarely completely available (e.g., farm household expenses and other revenues are 
not included in the farm accounting system). Therefore, in line with FGL, we adopt a simple 
revealed preference argument. The total expenditures over the accounting period indicate the 
maximum amount the farmer can spend on organising his production. In terms of the above 
figure, assuming that farmers intend to maximise profits, if observation e spends only the 
amount Ee this is probably because it has no other possibility (in terms of internal or external 
finance) to augment its expenditures. Otherwise, since it is profitable to spend more on inputs to 
obtain more outputs, it would have done so. Therefore, observed expenditures reveal the 
6eventual credit constraints in an implicit and imperfect way, since one cannot determine which 
of the internal or external financing sources causes the expenditure constraint to bind.  
In conclusion, while the revealed preference argument leads us to interpret the 
expenditure constraint as an indication of credit rationing, the fact that other constraints are 
ignored and that the sources of financing are not fully disclosed should make us cautious in its 
interpretation. It thus ideally reveals the subset of potentially credit constrained farms and one 
should expect that our approach tends to overestimate the presence of credit constraints. A 
detailed comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of our approach relative to alternative 
modelling strategies is discussed in the last subsection. We end with some concluding remarks. 
First, to take account of the separation between planning and production phases, the article 
actually introduces two types of credit constraints: a contemporaneous one, and another one 
lagged one year. The eventual resulting profit difference is interpreted in terms of planning 
adjustments. Second, the same story is valid for a short-run analysis accounting for input fixity.  
 
Technology and Distance Functions: Definitions 
This section introduces the necessary definitions of the production possibility set, the distance 
and profit functions. The estimation of efficiency relative to production frontiers relies on the 
theory of distance or gauge functions. In economics, Shephard distance functions are inversely 
related to the efficiency measures introduced by Farrell. The input distance function is dual to 
the cost function, while the output distance function is dual to the revenue function (Cornes; 
Färe and Primont). The methodological framework adopted in this article takes advantage of the 
shortage function (Luenberger) as a representation of technology. It generalises existing distance 
functions and accounts for both input contractions and output improvements when gauging 
efficiency. Chambers, Chung and Färe show that this shortage (or directional distance) function 
is dual to the profit function (see also Luenberger 1992, 1995). 
Technology transforms inputs 
n
n R x x x + ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  into outputs 
m
m R y y y + ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1 . The 
set of all feasible input and output vectors is the production possibility set T: 
(1)       { }. produce can ; ) , ( y x R y x T
m n+
+ ∈ =  
It is standard to impose the following assumptions (e.g, Färe and Primont): (T.1) 
0 ) , 0 ( , ) 0 , 0 ( = ⇒ ∈ ∈ y T y T  i.e., no outputs without inputs; (T.2) the set 
{} x u T y u x A ≤ ∈ = ; ) , ( ) (  of observations is bounded 
N R x + ∈ ∀ , i.e., infinite outputs are not 
allowed with a finite input vector; (T.3) T  is a closed set; (T.4) 
7T v u v u y x T y x ∈ ⇒ − ≤ − ∈ ∀ ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , ) , ( , i.e., fewer outputs can always be produced with more 
inputs, and inversely; (T.5) T is convex.  
We now discuss the recently introduced directional distance function  R T : DT →  that 
involves simultaneous proportional input and output variations:
3 
(2)     { }. ) , ( ; 0 sup ) , ; , ( T g y g x g g y x D o i
R





It is a special case of the shortage function (Luenberger) and the Farrell proportional distance 
(Briec), a generalization of the Farrell measure. Input and output distance functions also appear 
as special cases (see Chambers, Chung and Färe). Note that the directional distance function is 
defined using a general directional vector (-gi,go).  
We also need a short-run version of this directional distance function that involves 
simultaneous proportional variable input and output variations for a given sub-vector of fixed 
inputs. Therefore, the input set is partitioned into two subsets  { }
v N V ,..., 1 =  and 
{ } N N F
v ,..., 1 + = . V stands for the set of the variable inputs and F represents the set of fixed 
inputs. Obviously, {} F V N ∪ = ,..., 1 . Now, inputs are partitioned such that each input vector is 
denoted . ) , (




i g g g g =  Fixing  0 =
f
i g , the 
short-run directional distance function is then defined as: 














To analyse expenditure-constraints in production, we define two production possibility 
sets: (i) one with a long-run expenditure constraint:  
(4)     { }, . , ) , ( ; ) , ( L
m n E E x w T y x R y x T
L ≤ ∈ ∈ =
+
+  
and (ii) one with a short-run expenditure constraint: 
(5)     { }. . , ) , ( ; ) , ( S
v v m n E E x w T y x R y x T
S ≤ ∈ ∈ =
+
+  
Clearly, the first production possibility set aims at evaluating the presence of investment 
constraints, while the second set targets on revealing the existence of short-run financing 
constraints.
4  
The next element needed for our analysis is the standard long-run profit function:  
                                                           
3 Axiomatic properties are treated in detail in Briec and Chambers, Chung and Färe. 
4 To characterise production, it is possible to define long- and short-run versions of the proportional distance 
function relative to these expenditure-constrained production possibility sets. But expenditure-constrained 
directional distance functions are identical to their counterparts measured on technologies without expenditure 
constraints: since they look for reductions in inputs and expansions in outputs, they are unaffected by the presence 
of an expenditure constraint which only prevents selecting higher input levels. 
8(6)    
{}
{} . 0 ) , ; , ( ; . . sup








g g y x D x w y p
T y x x w y p p w
 
Luenberger and Chambers, Chung and Färe show duality between the directional distance 
function and the standard long-run profit function. 
Distinguishing between input prices of variable and fixed inputs  ) , (
f v w w w = , the short-
run or restricted total profit function is: 
(7)   {} , ) , , ( ; . . . sup ) , , (
,
T y x x x w x w y p x p w SR
f v f f v v
y x
f
v ∈ − − = Π  
while the short-run variable profit function is:  
(8)   { } T y x x x w y p x p w SRV
f v v v
y x
f v
v ∈ − = Π ) , , ( ; . . sup ) , , (
,
 
Obviously,  ) , , ( ) , , (
f v f v x p w SR x p w SRV Π ≥ Π . 
It is rather straightforward to establish duality between the short-run directional distance 
function (3) and the short-run variable profit function (8).
5  
 
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions above, we have: 
a)  {} 0 ) ; , ( ; . . sup ) , , (
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inf ) ; , , (
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g w g p
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Proof: See Appendix 1.  
 
To take account of credit-constraints when optimising profits, we first need to define the 
long-run expenditure-constrained profit function:  
(9)   { }, ) , ( ; . . sup ) , , (
L E
L T y x x w y p E p w EC ∈ − = Π  
where  L E  is the predetermined level of expenditures the producer cannot exceed when 
procuring all inputs. The definition of the corresponding short-run variable expenditure-
constrained profit function is: 
                                                           
5 Actually, since we develop a difference-based version of this duality relationship, this duality result would also 
hold between the short-run total profit function (7) and the short-run directional distance function (3), since the 
fixed cost terms cancel out. However, in a ratio based approach, such duality result could not be maintained, while 
the former (between (3) and (8)) can. Therefore, we focus on the former duality result. 
9(10)   { }, , ) , ( ; . . sup ) , , , (
f f E v v
S
f x x T y x x w y p E x p w SRVEC
S = ∈ − = Π  
where  S E  is the amount of outlays one can spend on variable inputs solely.
6 
 
Integrating Credit Constraints into Profit Efficiency Decompositions 
Having defined all basic elements for gauging performance, we can treat the problem of 
defining a proper decomposition of efficiency. First, we repeat the basic additive decomposition 
of profit efficiency developed in Chambers, Chung and Färe  and briefly indicate how it can be 
defined for the short-run case. Then, transforming the FGL ratio approach to the additive 
context, we extend the analysis for the expenditure-constrained context in both the long- and the 
short-run. 
Chambers, Chung and Färe first define the overall efficiency (OE(x,y,p,w)) index as the 
quantity: 
(11)      
i o wg pg
x w y p w p




) . . ( ) , (
) , , , ( 
Then, they continue by characterising a technical efficiency (TE(x,y)) index as the quantity: 
(12)       ) , ( ) , ( y x D y x TE T =  
Finally, the allocative efficiency (AE(x,y,p,w)) index is defined as the quantity: 
(13)         ) , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( y x D w p y x OE w p y x AE T − =  
Thus, OE(x,y,p,w) is simply the ratio between (i) the difference between maximum profit and 
the observed profits for the observation evaluated and (ii) the normalised value of the direction 
vector ) , ( o i g g g − =  for given output and input prices (p,w). Chambers, Chung and Färe call 
this Nerlovian efficiency. Having previously defined technical and allocative efficiency in 
detail, the notion of overall efficiency ensures that both these ideals of technical and allocative 
efficiency are realised simultaneously. Obviously, the following additive decomposition identity 
holds: 
(14)       ) , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( y x TE p w y x AE p w y x OE + =   
Notice that all three components are semi-positive, with zero indicating efficiency. This implies 
that increases in efficiency are reflected in decreasing scores.
7 
                                                           
6 These profit functions are dual to long-run respectively short-run expenditure-constrained directional distance 
functions mentioned in the preceding footnote. 
7 Balk defines all three components such that they are semi-negative, with zero again indicating efficiency and 
increasing efficiency scores now reflecting increases in efficiency. 
10 
Similar components of overall efficiency based upon the short-run variable profit 
function can be defined. Setting the fixed input dimensions in the directional vector equal to 
zero ( 0 =
f
i g ), short-run overall efficiency ( ) , , , , ( p w y x x SROE
f v ) is defined as the quantity: 







x w y p x p w SRV




) . . ( ) , , (
) , , , , ( 
We briefly spell out the above decomposition. Short-run technical efficiency corresponds to the 
short-run directional distance function ( ). , , ( ) , , (
f v g y x SRD y x x SRTE T = ). A short-run allocative 
efficiency ( ) , , , , ( p w y x x SRAE
f v ) index again bridges the gap between  ) , , , , ( p w y x x SROE
f v  
and  ) , , (
f v y x x SRTE . Since in the empirical section we cannot separate the latter components, 
we ignore this basic taxonomy in the extended decompositions of overall efficiency developed 
below. 
Next, we turn to the issue of adopting the FGL decomposition for the additive context. 
They distinguish between actual and financial short-run efficiency. Actual efficiency is defined 
as the ratio between observed profits and a short-run expenditure-constrained profit function. 
Financial efficiency is identified as the short-run expenditure-constrained profit function divided 
by the short-run profit function. Inspired by FGL, we can now start adapting the above overall 
efficiency components for the expenditure-constrained context. The decomposition needs 
mainly adaptation since lagged expenditure constraints are included in the empirical analysis, 
representing the separation between planning and production phases in agriculture. This leads us 
to add a planning efficiency component to the above decomposition. We first develop the 
extended decomposition from a long-run perspective. Thereafter, we switch to a short-run 
viewpoint taking account of short-term fixities in inputs.  
First, one can define long-run financial efficiency as the difference between overall 
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where the long-run expenditure-constrained overall efficiency (ECOE) index incorporating a 
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This component is positive whenever the lagged expenditure constraint turns out be binding in 
the long-run expenditure-constrained profit function. When this expenditure constraint is active, 
then the long-run overall efficiency is larger than the long-run expenditure-constrained overall 
efficiency. This component indicates the loss of profits due to the expenditure constraint. It 
thereby reveals any eventual difficulties farmers encounter when financing their investments.  
Then, long-run planning efficiency can be characterised as the difference between long-
















E p w EC E p w EC







) , , ( ) , , (




where the long-run expenditure-constrained overall efficiency index incorporating a 
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) . . ( ) , , (
) , , , , (  
Since parts of the earlier planning may be revised when necessary due to certain contingencies, 
lagged planning and actual budgets may well slightly diverge. This eventual difference shows 
up in the associated long-run expenditure-constrained profit functions. This long-run planning 
efficiency component can be interpreted as a planning adjustment, since it takes both positive 
and negative values. 
Finally, long-run actual efficiency is: 




L E p w y x ECOE E p w y x LRACTE =  
It is the difference between the long-run expenditure-constrained profit function and observed 
profits, normalised by the value of the directional vector. 
Clearly, the complete decomposition now reads: 
(21)






L L E p w y x LRACTE E E p w y x LRPE E p w y x LRFE p w y x LROE + + =
−
 
Basically, this is just the difference-based equivalent of the ratio-based efficiency decomposition 
of FGL, extended with a long-run planning efficiency component, because of the presence of a 
lagged expenditure constraint.
8 
                                                           
8 The last component, i.e., long-run actual efficiency, can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiencies. 
The same remark also applies to the short-run equivalent expression developed further down the text. 
12 
Turning to a short-run perspective, one first defines short-run financial efficiency as the 
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where the short-run expenditure-constrained overall efficiency (SRECOE) index incorporating a 
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1  
This component is positive whenever the lagged expenditure constraint turns out be binding in 
the short-run expenditure-constrained profit function. When this expenditure constraint is active, 
then the short-run overall efficiency is larger than the short-run expenditure-constrained overall 
efficiency. Consequently, a positive component measures short-run profits foregone because of 
the expenditure constraint.  
Then, short-run planning efficiency can be characterised as the difference between short-
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where the short-run expenditure-constrained overall efficiency index incorporating a 
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Since parts of the earlier planning may be revised, when necessary due to certain contingencies, 
lagged planning and actual budgets may well slightly diverge. This eventual difference shows 
up in the associated short-run variable expenditure-constrained profit functions. This short-run 
planning efficiency component can be interpreted as a planning adjustment, since it can take 
both positive and negative values. 
Finally, short-run actual efficiency is: 





f v E p w y x x SRECOE E p w y x x SRACTE =  
13 
It is the difference between the short-run expenditure-constrained variable profit function and 
observed variable profits, normalised by the value of the directional vector. 
Clearly, the complete decomposition now reads: 
(27)
) , , , , , ( ) , , , , , , ( ) , , , , , (
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etails about the computations of the underlying frontier technologies are spelled out in 
appendix 2 (available upon request). 
 
Contrast with Other Methodologies 
Several approaches yield evidence of the existence of credit constraints affecting agricultural 
production. We briefly mention these methods and highlight their advantages and shortcomings 
as they have been surveyed by Petrick. First, one can attempt to directly measure loan 
transaction costs (cost of information collection, application, etc.). But, this is problematic 
because (i) rationing here becomes a price rather than a quantity concept, and (ii) there are 
evaluation problems of opportunity cost both on the side of clients (e.g., time) and suppliers, 
among others. Second, qualitative information can be obtained via interviews asking whether 
people would have liked to borrow more at prevailing interest rates. This method mainly suffers 
(i) from the subjective nature of responses and (ii) it cannot assess the severity of rationing. A 
variation on this second method is to ask the respondent for his credit limit, i.e., the maximum 
amount a lender is offering. But, while answers to this question yield quantitative information, 
this type of question turns out to be difficult to understand and to respond precisely. Third, the 
access of farmers to alternative sources of credit (e.g., informal and trade credit) yields a picture 
of the spillover effects of eventual limited access to the primary source of formal credit 
channels. This approach offers valuable information when the assumption that secondary credit 
sources are more expensive than primary sources proves valid.  
Fourth, using a static, micro-economic household model the impact of credit restrictions 
can be tested by checking whether farmer’s consumption and investment decisions are mutually 
dependent and by comparing marginal revenues of credit to observable interest rates.
9 Finally, 
another theoretically well-founded approach uses a stochastic dynamic model of investment and 
derives its first-order conditions as a basis for econometric specification (see also the survey by 
                                                           
9 Phimister is an example of a study providing some simulations for France (and ignored by Petrick). 
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Hubbard).
10 For USA data, e.g., Hubbard and Kashyap and Bierlen and Featherstone find 
significant influence of financial variables on investment that lead them to reject the perfect 
capital market model. Benjamin and Phimister provide estimates for French and British farmers: 
while in the earlier study financial variables do not improve model fit, the later study finds 
significant financial variables. But, there are some minor differences among both countries: e.g., 
sensitivity to cash flow is higher in France. Petrick maintains that the last two approaches are 
very demanding in terms of data availability and depend on the validity of the assumptions used 
in the econometric and simulation methods (functional forms, specification, etc.).
11 We return to 
the evaluation of both approaches below. 
To complete the taxonomy of methodologies in Petrick, it is eventually useful to mention 
two more approaches. First, bio-economic simulation models have marginally touched upon the 
eventual presence of credit constraints (see Oriade and Dillon for a review). For instance, 
Boussard has found some evidence of credit rationing for French farmers. Second, the analysis 
of inefficiencies in production and its underlying causes yields some perspectives on the 
influence of credit rationing (see the survey by Battese). Since our approach is situated within 
this literature, we offer a small selection of studies. Ali and Flinn report credit constraints among 
the socio-economic factors explaining profit inefficiencies in Pakistan. Other studies 
corroborating the influence of credit constraints as an explanatory factor of poor performance 
include Kalirajan using Philippine data and Liu and Zhuang studying Chinese data, among 
others. Similar results have been reported for agriculture in developed countries. Brümmer and 
Loy evaluate the European Farm Credit Program (FCP) whereby selected “competitive” farms 
obtain investment loans at subsidised interest rates. This improved access to capital and hence 
new technologies should increase farmers’ productivity. However, for a large panel of dairy 
farms in North Germany they find the FCP fails to increase technical efficiency of participating 
farms. Nasr, Barry and Ellinger, testing several explanations for the relation between financing 
and farm efficiency, find some support for Jensen’s free cash flow concept whereby a greater 
dependence on debt to finance current operations improves technical efficiency.  
Compared to the main literature on production inefficiencies, our model measures the 
presence of credit constraints directly rather than indirectly, i.e., as a determinant of measured 
inefficiencies in a second stage regression. We believe our own approach shares with the two 
last approaches mentioned in the Petrick survey that it is well-founded in micro-economic 
                                                           
10 These dynamic investment models often include a debt ceiling constraint: Chatelain shows how to obtain an 
explicit expression for the Lagrange multiplier of such a binding constraint.  
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theory. A more detailed comparison with these two approaches can be made along the following 
lines. First, while our contribution remains entirely static just like the household model 
investigating farm consumption and investment, the investment Euler equations involve 
dynamic optimisation behaviour. Second, we employ nonparametric technologies that do not 
impose any functional form on technology, while the results of both other approaches may well 
be affected by choice of particular functional forms. Third, our contribution uses frontier 
technologies that allow for any eventual inefficiency, while both other approaches maintain the 
hypothesis of perfectly static respectively dynamic optimising behaviour. Fourth, the binding 
nature of the credit constraint is endogenously determined in our approach just like in the farm 
household model, but unlike the investment models where this is often added under the form of 
prior information.  
Overall, from the above comparison it should be clear that our empirical modeling strategy 
uses as few maintained hypotheses as possible.
12 The main qualifications are (i) that the 
expenditure constraint only reveals problems of access to internal or external credit imperfectly, 
and (ii) that the profit frontier model that builds upon minimal axioms does not account for 
measurement error, though the second stage statistical analysis explaining the measured 
deviations between observations and the frontier (i.e., inefficiency) does. After this extensive 
methodological discussion, we can turn to the empirical analysis. 
 
Description of the Sample and Empirical Results 
Sample: Description and Details on Model Specifications 
The sample from CER (Centre d’Economie Rurale du Pas-de-Calais) contains 178 French farms 
in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais observed from 1994 to 2001. The farms in this balanced panel are 
specialised in cash crops (grain, sugar beets, etc.). Livestock is of little or no importance for 
them. One French bank (Crédit Agricole) has an almost monopoly on agricultural financing. Its 
position is reinforced by the fact that it is also an agent for government policies (e.g., subsidised 
credit). It grew out of a regional system of co-operative banks and was privatised in 1988 (see 
Benjamin and Phimister).  
Financial data are expressed in Euro in constant 1994 prices and are deflated using their 
own price indices. Turning to the specification of technology, output is measured by total sales 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
11 Petrick also points out that both approaches assume that credit rationing leads to underinvestment. This need not 
be the case (see De Meza and Webb). 
12 This simply responds to a suggestion of Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (p. 223): “Given the qualitative, non-
parametric nature of the fundamental axioms, this suggests […] that the more relevant tests will be non-parametric, 
rather than based on parametric functional forms, even very general ones.” 
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(SALES). We define two variable inputs and three fixed inputs. Variable inputs are: (i) materials 
and operational expenses (seed, fertilizers, pesticides, energy, gas, water, etc.) 
(OPERATIONAL EXPENSES), (ii) taxes and salaries of hired labour (EMPLOYEES) 
expressed as full time equivalent (2,400 working hours/year) farm employees. The three fixed 
inputs are: (i) An annual depreciation (over a period of 15 years) of building and capital 
equipment services (IMMOBILIZATIONS). (ii) The cost of land is based on rental rates and the 
opportunity cost of ownership. The surface area is weighted by yield per unit to account for 
fertility differences (SURFACE AREA). More precisely, the yield per hectare per year divided 
by the average yield per hectare per year in the sample corrects empirically observed fertility 
differences.
13 (iii) The cost of family labour is the sum of minimum wages and the social 
security taxes paid by employers. One unit of family labour equals 2,400 hours a year. Their 
wage is the minimum (defined by the French SMIC) plus social security contributions by 
employer. 
Descriptive statistics for this sample are provided in table 1. The sample contains some 
heterogeneity in size for certain variables, though in general the spread is rather low. The 
coefficients of variation are smaller than unity, except for hired labour. The real annual growth 
rates are (i) total labour 0.73%, (ii) surface area 1.11%, (iii) operational expenses 2.04%, (iv) 
immobilizations 4.97%, and (v) sales 2.59%. Details on the evolution of inputs and outputs over 
time are displayed in figures in appendix 3 (available upon simple request). 
 





Variation Minimum  Maximum 
Family Labour (FTE)  1.37 0.56 0.41 0.00  3.80
Employees (FTE)  0.43 0.73 1.69 0.00  4.00
Surface area (ha)  112.24 60.52 0.54 20.80  340.00
Operational expenses (€)
*  51 350.73 31 438.88 0.61 6 162.90  185 931.52
Immobilizations (€)
*  38 863.54 30 100.25 0.77 1 612.66  268 997.05
Sales (€)
*  225 343.04 138 343.95 0.61 24 678.06  937 601.64
* Constant prices of 1994. 
 
                                                           
13 Unfortunately, there is no agronomical fertility index available for these individual farms. Notice that the analysis 
has also been performed without correcting for yield differences: these results are qualitatively very similar and are 
available in appendix 3 that can be obtained from the authors upon simple request.  
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Although the price evolution over time is known, the sample does not contain any prices 
at the farm level, but only revenues (costs) per output (input) category. The assumption that all 
farmers face identical prices each year is plausible because most output prices are regulated by 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and most inputs are procured within the same regional 
markets where prices between firms differ little. Strong price variations over time (especially for 
the outputs) have been corrected each year by deflating values by their respective price indices. In 
summary, the data available were adjusted to maintain the assumption of identical prices at any 
point in time.  
Under the assumption of identical prices, FGL (page 577) shows all profit functions 
defined above can be estimated using revenue and cost categories. The resulting optimal profit 
levels are identical. Since no input and output quantities are available, technical efficiency 
cannot be computed. Allocative efficiency, closing the gap between technical and overall 
efficiency, is also unavailable. Since the technical and allocative efficiency components drop 
out, this simplifies the short- and long-term profit efficiency decompositions. The identical 
prices assumption does not imply anything about the competitiveness of the concerned markets. 
Should markets be uncompetitive, the principal issue is that farmers have the same market 
power. This is plausible given their similar structure and size. Maximum allowable expenditures 
are calculated as the observed expenditures on variable inputs ( S E ), following the specification 
in FGL, respectively all inputs ( L E ), inspired by Whittaker and Morehart.  
With respect to the panel nature of the sample, we opted to estimate non-parametric 
production technology frontiers for each year separately imposing minimal assumptions (i.e., 
strong input and output disposability, convexity, and variable returns to scale).
14 In agriculture 
technology shifts are partly subject to random (e.g., climatic) variations. Estimating production 
technologies year-by-year imposes minimal assumptions with respect to the nature of 
technological change. Other options are available that imply alternate and stronger hypotheses. 
For example, it is possible to estimate an intertemporal frontier by including all observations in 
the reference technology immediately while disregarding the time dimension (Tulkens and 
Vanden Eeckaut (1995)). In other words, the panel data set is treated as if it were a cross-
section. While this presupposes the absence of technological change, it may enhance the 
precision of estimates. It is possible to simplify the latter assumption by correcting the data 
entering into the intertemporal frontier for technological change. Following a strategy adopted 
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and inspired by Tauer and Stefanides, this can be done using the technological change 
component of recent productivity indices/indicators (e.g., Malmquist or Luenberger 
(Chambers)). These indices/indicators essentially compare observations relative to two 
production technologies each representing a given year. In this case the time dimension in the 
second stage panel estimation only is supposed to capture variations in technical efficiency.  
To minimise bias when estimating the presence of credit constraints, a minimalist 
strategy is selected in terms of maintained hypotheses and we compute year-by-year frontiers. 
However, the results for the other two specifications of technology (i.e., intertemporal frontier 
with and without correcting for technological change) are also computed. These are available in 
appendix 3 (available upon request).
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Empirical Results: The Extent of Credit Rationing among French Farmers  
Short-run expenditure-constrained and -unconstrained profits were estimated using a profit 
frontier per year over the period 1995-2001. Indeed, the introduction of a one-year lagged 
expenditure constraint in some models leads to a loss of one year. Consequently, profit 
calculations only relate to the years 1995-2001. In addition, all monetary data were deflated to 
obtain real terms. 
Table 2 lists the average efficiency scores for the various components at the sample 
level. On average, overall efficiency is 30.24% and 76.59% respectively in the short- and the 
long-run. This implies that farms could improve their normalised profits by about 30% and 76%. 
In the short-run, overall efficiency is explained by actual efficiency at 23%, financial efficiency 
at 8% and planning efficiency at -1.5%. A battery of nonparametric test statistics clearly 
confirms that all these efficiency scores, except the planning component, are significantly 
different from zero (see appendix 3).
16  
Thus, while mismanagement and technical problems explain most of the gap between the 
level of observed and maximal profits of farms, the short-run financial constraints also have 
undeniable effects. In the long-run perspective financial constraints become the predominant 
source of ill functioning. In particular, limited access to financial resources explains 49% of 
overall efficiency. Actual inefficiencies remain substantial, but are secondary in importance, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 See Färe and Primont (1995). There is a minor methodological quibble here: the popular strongly disposable, 
convex non-parametric technology imposing variable returns to scale -also used for our estimates- satisfies all 
assumptions mentioned in § II.2, except inaction. 
15 Data are adjusted using a Luenberger productivity indicator (Chambers). Since the latter is based upon directional 
distance functions, it is compatible with the hypothesis of profit maximising behaviour maintained throughout the 
paper. 
16 Since distributions of efficiency scores are clearly non-normal, traditional parametric tests are inappropriate. 
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while planning efficiency again turns around zero. The planning efficiency component is close 
to zero on average in both perspectives. This clearly confirms the interpretation about the 
possibility of farmers to align initial and planned budgets when needed.  
 
Table 2. Average Efficiency Scores over the Years 1995-2001 
 Short-Run  Long-Run 
Financial Efficiency  8.34% 48.81%
Actual Efficiency  23.39% 28.81%
Planning Efficiency  -1.48% -1.02%
Overall Efficiency  30.24% 76.59%
 
Observe that FGL focusing on a sample of 82 farms producing rice in 1984, have 
estimated the loss of profit due to credit-constraints to 8 %. Finally, using a parametric 
approach, Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar estimate the loss of efficiency for a 
small sample of individual jute growers in West Bengal at around 6.4 %. These numbers are of 
the same order as our short-run results. Unfortunately, we have no point of comparison for our 
long-run results. It is useful to add that short-run financial efficiency improves until 1999 to 
deteriorate again thereafter, while the long-run financial efficiency deteriorates continuously 
within our time period (see the figures in appendix 3). 
Table 3 summarises whether the credit constraint is binding or not in the short- and 
long-run, as well as the average shadow prices. This provides some indicative information about 
the severity of credit constraints in this French region. On average, we observe that about 67% 
of farms are financially constrained in the short-run. However, nearly all farms face investment 
constraints in the long-run. By contrast, FGL report that only 21% of farms were financially 
constrained in the short-run. This result is probably due to the fact that their farms are relatively 
bigger in size, resulting in an apparently easier access to credit. Of course, also their small 
sample size may well have an influence. Whittaker and Morehart, in another study analysing a 
sample of large Midwest grain farms, note that only one in five farms is financially constrained 
in either the short or the long-run. Only a small minority of farms (about 1.8 %) are found to be 
simultaneously financially constrained in short- and long-run. Again their focus on larger size 
farms may partly explain the differences with our results.  
The average value of the shadow price of the credit constraint reveals that a one-unit 
relaxation adds almost 1.60 to the profit in the short-run, while it adds more than 1.35 to the 
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long-run profit. These average shadow interests rates are far above market interest rates. Just as 
in the indirect method to model consumption and production decisions in the farm household, 
this divergence is evidence of credit rationing and the mark-up quantifies its severity. It seems 
clear that both the short- and long-run development of these farms is seriously jeopardised by a 
lack of access to credit respectively investment capital. A disaggregated analysis of shadow 
prices per year is available in appendix 3 
 
Table 3. Status of Credit Constraint and Average Shadow Prices over the Years 1995-2001 










* n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
One plausible mechanism behind the overwhelming presence of binding credit 
constraints is that the majority of farms faces increasing returns to scale. Indeed, determining 
local returns to scale information for each farm using the directional distance function reveals 
that almost 61.6% of farms enjoy increasing returns to scale, while about 28,9% are subject to 
decreasing returns to scale, and 9.5% have optimal scale (Fukuyama).  
Summarising the empirical results so far, financial efficiency is important in the short- 
and especially in the long-run and is costly in terms of foregone profits. The returns to scale 
results suggest that the relative small size of many farms is related to their limited access to the 
credit market and this lack of credit availability is expensive in terms of forgone profits. Of 
course, other structural factors (like CAP, increasingly restrictive environmental regulations, 
land market rigidities, adjustment costs, etc.), may also contribute to explaining the survival of 
farms of heterogeneous sizes in Europe. Evidently, it is useful to recall the important proviso 
that strictly speaking our approach only identifies farms that are potentially credit constrained, a 
superset of the effectively credit constrained farms. This implies an upward bias in our estimates 
of the presence of credit constraints that may partly explain the pervasive nature of credit 
rationing in our sample and the high value of the shadow prices. 
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Empirical Results: A Tobit Analysis of Financial Efficiency 
In this subsection, we use Tobit analysis to investigate the determinants of observed 
heterogeneity in measured financial efficiency scores to shed some light on credit rationing. 
Since financial inefficiency basically measures the profits foregone because of the presence of 
expenditure constraints (proxying credit and investment constraints), one expects that its 
determinants are more or less similar than the ones figuring in agricultural credit scoring 
models. The latter type of models evaluates credit applications in terms of their default risk. 
Hence, it is custom in this literature to identify several categories of variables when evaluating 
agricultural loans: solvency, repayment capacity and profitability, collateral, managerial 
performance, and social and environmental characteristics (see, e.g., Ellinger, Splett and Barry).  
First, variables representing the financial structure of the farm should play a role under 
capital market imperfections. Therefore, following Bierlen and Featherstone we include a debt 
to asset ratio (variable Debt to asset ratio) representing the dependency and access to external 
finance. The less one is constrained in terms of access to credit, the lower the resulting financial 
inefficiency. In addition, we add the variable Rate of debt charges reflecting a standard measure 
employed by banks to evaluate the default risk of potential lenders. It indicates the financial 
effort (principal and interest rate payments) relative to profitability measured by the operating 
result (sales minus all costs except financing costs). A high Rate of debt charges is expected to 
deteriorate financial efficiency.  
Second, the production structure of farms may well affect their financial efficiency. 
Relative to other specialisations, cash crops farms are more land intensive and their total (own 
and hired) land size represents the highest share of all tangible assets.
17 Thus, due to its role as 
collateral, the variable Surface area is the main variable determining loan grants by French 
agricultural banks. To account more precisely for the role of farm size in our analysis, we also 
add the explicit returns to scale characteristics discussed previously, i.e., dummy variables 
representing constant (DCRS) and increasing (DIRS) returns to scale. Furthermore, within the 
context of our specialised farms focusing mainly on cereals and sugar beets, the ratio of value 
added (VA) over sales (variable Rate VA) can only improve by cultivating at least also some 
higher value-added crops (andives, cauliflower, etc.). Therefore, in our context of almost 
monoculture farming, it can reveal a strategy of diversification. It is well known that the 
simultaneous existence of a variety of technologies allows farms to have some flexibility to 
                                                           
17 This is especially the case in Northern France where a new tenant must repay the right to cultivate the land to the 
previous tenant. This compensation almost equals the market price for land. Therefore, even hired land can be 
considered an asset. 
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adopt their size and that economies of scope are substantial, but seem to diminish with size 
(Chavas). Finally, the ratio of own capital to value added (variable Own capital/Value added) is 
included as a measure of own capital intensity. It represents the immobilisation of fully owned 
financial means in the production structure. 
Third, we control for managerial performance, business cycle and life cycle effects by 
adding some additional variables. To begin with, we add a variable Sales/Surface as a proxy of 
the main crops weighted yields. In addition, we add a series of year dummies D1995 to D2000 
relative to the reference year 2001 to account for any temporal variations. Finally, the farmer’s 
age (variable Age) is well-known to impact credit demand, because of life-cycle effects (Bierlen 
and Featherstone).  
Turning to a comparative statistical analysis of the characteristics of farms according to 
their financial situation, we utilise the above discussed potential explanatory variables.
18 More 
precisely, we report in table 4 the results of a multivariate panel regression model between 
financial efficiency and these criteria. Given the relative nature of benchmarking, efficiency 
scores are bounded below by zero to indicate relative efficiency. Therefore, negative signs 
indicate improvements of financial efficiency, while positive signs indicate the reverse. 
Furthermore, to account for this censored nature of efficiency scores, a random effect panel 
Tobit regression estimator is employed.
19 The p-values are underneath the estimates between 
brackets. The low p-values for the Wald test indicate that the independent variables contribute to 
explaining the variation of financial efficiencies. To quickly assess the pertinence of a panel 
approach we look at the value of ρ. This number measures the relative contribution of the 
variance of individual specific error terms to the total variance of residuals. Its values between 
30% and 53% clearly point to the usefulness of the panel estimators. 
Focusing first on the effects common to both short- and long-run, this table indicates 
that, all things otherwise being equal, a lower level of financial inefficiency goes hand in hand 
with: (i) a bigger size in terms of surface area (variable Surface area); (ii) higher productive 
performance, defined in terms of sales per surface area (variable Sales/Surface area). By 
contrast, a higher rate of value added increases financial inefficiency in the short- as well as in 
the long-run. A plausible explanation is that obtaining a production with a high rate of value 
added requires specialisation and such a specialisation strategy is conditional upon major 
investments. Furthermore, compared to the reference year 2001, short- and long-run financial 
                                                           
18 Except for all dummy variables, this choice of variables corresponds to the ones figuring in the CER credit 
scoring models upon which they base their financial advice to the farms in our sample. 
19 The procedure xttobit in STATA 8 has been employed. 
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efficiencies improved respectively in the years 1996-2000 respectively 1995-2000, as can be 
inferred from the year dummies D1995 to D2000.  
 
Table 4. Panel Data Tobit Regression Results for Short- and Long-Run Financial 
Efficiency 
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(0.001)


















































ρ  0.302 0.526 
*  P values are in parenthesis, ρ measures the relative contribution of the variance of individual specific error 
terms to the total variance of residuals; Wald test is distributed Chi
2, with yit = xitB + ui + eit (H0: Bj=a vs. 
H1 : Bj ≠a). 
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There is an opposite effect in the short- versus the long-run concerning the impact of 
producing at constant returns to scale (as indicated by the dummy variable DCRS). While 
producing at optimal scale enhances the short-run financial efficiency, in the long-run it 
contributes to financial inefficiency. Furthermore, there are some variables that are only 
significant in either the short- or the long-run. This is notably the case for the age (variable Age) 
that improves the short-run financial efficiency, but yields no significant impact on long-run 
financial efficiency. According to the farm life cycle model, liquidity shortages (savings, cash, 
…) are a more crucial managerial problem for young farmers in the short-run. Similar effects 
concerning the age of farmers have been reported by, for example, Tauer and Kaiser. Moreover, 
a higher rate of debts, identified using the ratio of total debts to assets (variable Debt to asset 
ratio), improves long-run financial efficiency, but exerts no significant effect in the short-run. 
The ratio own capital to value added (variable Own capital/Value added) damages short-run 
financial efficiency only. Finally, the rate of debt charges, defined in terms of the repayment of 
capital and interests divided by the operating result (variable Rate of debt charges) generates no 
significant impact on the short-run, but it does affect the long-run financial efficiency of most 
farms negatively.  
These results taken together suggest the existence of a leverage effect, in the sense that 
debts are profitable for the biggest farms that can offer better financial and technical guarantees. 
Since they have an easier access to credit, they enjoy more flexible possibilities to adapt their 
technologies. Thus, debts seem to create a virtuous circle eventually improving the global 
performance of the larger farms. Similar conclusions have been reported elsewhere. For 
instance, O’Neill and Matthews conclude that more indebted Irish dairy farmers experience 
limited technical inefficiency to ensure that debts can be repaid. Chavas and Aliber identify a 
positive relation between the debt to assets ratio and technical efficiency for Wisconsin farms in 
1987. All these results support the free cash flow hypothesis (see also supra) suggesting that 
indebted farmers are motivated to improve their efficiency to ensure their repayment 
capabilities. These results indicate that technical efficiency facilitates capital accumulation via 
external credit. This capital accumulation improves productivity, which in turn increases 
profitability and financial efficiency.  
In the literature also a few other effects have been reported. For instance, Whittaker and 
Morehart report that debt-constrained farms owe their debt predominantly to federally 
subsidised institutions. Since the latter can be considered as lenders of last resort, this may well 
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indicate these farms suffer serious financial difficulties. In our sample, we have no information 
on these characteristics, which inhibits any comparison between studies in this respect. 
 
Conclusions 
This contribution has studied the presence of credit constraints in French agriculture. To the best 
of our knowledge, it is the first empirical application investigating the presence of credit 
constraints in European agriculture using a direct modelling approach based upon axiomatic 
production theory. In particular, the credit constrained profit maximisation model of FGL is 
extended in three ways. First, the model is rephrased in terms of directional distance functions 
and a duality relationship between the short-run directional distance function and the short-run 
profit function is formulated. Second, the presence of credit constraints in the short-run and 
investment constraints in the long-run is modelled using short- respectively long-run credit 
constrained profit functions. Third, the expenditure constraint is lagged one year to account for 
the separation between planning and production in agriculture. 
The empirical application focuses on a panel of French farmers in the Nord-Pas-de-
Calais region. We find evidence on the presence of both credit and investment constraints. 
While in the short-run there are important actual inefficiencies linked to a poor management of 
factors that inhibit farm profitability, the financial situation has an incontestable influence on 
performance. Financially unconstrained farmers tend to be larger and perform better. Our results 
are coherent with the intuition that these farmers suffer less from credit constraints, because they 
can offer better guarantees to lenders. These farms seem to benefit from a virtuous circle where 
access to financial markets allows better productive choices. In the long-run, almost all farms 
seem to suffer from credit constraints for financing their investments.  
Being the first study focusing on European agriculture, it would be good to see some 
additional work corroborating these results. With all reservations because of this need for 
duplication, it is probably evident that the European CAP should pay more attention to credit 
rationing. Indeed, it is fair to say that the CAP, even after several reform packages, largely 
ignores the financing problems faced by European farmers. However, our results point out that 
facilitating access to both short- and long-run credit offers a valuable, additional policy 
instrument. This additional instrument could well improve the regulation of agriculture and 
complete the recent European policies aimed at direct revenue support developed in a context of 
liberalisation and instability of agricultural markets. For instance, it may be desirable to consider 
a system of public sector financial guarantees similar to certain existing private initiatives, 
26 
mostly at a cooperative level, to alleviate problems of collateral. Furthermore, an additional 
source of external financing could be the creation of loans with annuities varying over the 
agricultural business cycle. Finally, making leasing operations more attractive by extending their 
fiscal deductibility could free additional internal financial resources. These are but a series of 
policy proposals that merit further attention in the European context (especially given the EU 
enlargement process and the challenge of modernising agricultural technologies in new member 
states). The policy experience in other developed countries may well provide an additional 
source of inspiration for these matters (see Barry and Robison).  
We end with one suggestion for future work. When information on both quantities and 
prices would be available, this type of credit-constrained profit maximisation model could well 
be used to isolate the impact of financial constraints and price policies on the production choices 
of farmers (e.g., in realistic models explicitly accounting for land set-aside provisions: see Ball 
et al. and Moro and Sckokai). 
 
References 
Ali, M., and J.C Flinn. “Profit Efficiency among Basmati Rice Producers in Pakistan Punjab.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(1989):303−310. 
Balk, B.M. Industrial Price, Quantity, and Productivity Indices: The Micro-Economic Theory and 
an Application. Boston: Kluwer, 1998. 
Ball, V., J.-C. Bureau, K. Eakin, and A. Somwaru. “CAP Reform: Modelling Supply Response 
Subject to the Land Set-Aside.” Agricultural Economics 17(1997):277−288.  
Barry, P.J., and L.J. Robison. “Agricultural Finance: Credit, Credit Constraints, and 
Consequences.” In B. Gardner and G. Rausser, ed. Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 
vol. 1a, Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2001., pp. 513−571. 
Battese, G.E. “Frontier Production Functions and Technical Efficiency: A Survey of Empirical 
Applications in Agricultural Economics.” Agricultural Economics 7(1992):185−208. 
Benjamin, C., and E. Phimister. “Does Capital Market Structure Affect Farm Investment? A 
Comparison Using French and British Farm-Level Panel Data.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 84(2002):1115−1129. 
−−. “Transaction Costs, Farm Finance and Investment.” European Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 24(1997):453−466. 
27 
Bhattacharyya, A., A. Bhattacharyya, and S. Kumbhakar. “Governmental Interventions, Market 
Imperfections, and Technical Inefficiency in a Mixed Economy: A Case Study of Indian 
Agriculture.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 22(1996):219−241. 
Bierlen, R., and A.M. Featherstone. “Fundamental q, Cash Flow, and Investment: Evidence from 
Farm Panel Data.” Review of Economics and Statistics 80(1998): 427−435. 
Boussard, J.-M.  Economie de l’agriculture. Paris: Economica, 1987.  
Briec, W. “A Graph-Type Extension of Farrell Technical Efficiency Measure.” Journal of 
Productivity Analysis 8(1997):95−110. 
Brümmer, B., and J.-P. Loy. “The Technical Efficiency Impact of Farm Credit Programmes: A 
Case Study of Northern Germany.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 51(2000):405−418. 
Chambers, R.G. “Exact Nonradial Input, Output, and Productivity Measurement.” Economic 
Theory 20(2002): 751−765. 
Chambers, R.G., Y. Chung, and R. Färe. “Profit, Directional Distance Functions, and Nerlovian 
Efficiency.” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 98(1998):351−364. 
Chatelain J.-B. “Explicit Lagrange Multiplier for Firms Facing a Debt Ceiling Constraint.” 
Economics Letters 67(2000):153–158. 
Chavas, J.-P. “Structural Change in Agricultural Production: Economics, Technology and Policy”, 
In B. Gardner, and G. Rausser, ed. Handbook of Agricultural Economics, vol. 1a, 
Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2001., pp. 263−285. 
Chavas J.-P. and M. Aliber. “An Analysis of Economic Efficiency in Agriculture: A 
Non-Parametric Approach.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
18(1993):1−16. 
Cornes, R. Duality and Modern Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
De Meza, D., and D. Webb. “Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1987):281−292. 
Ellinger, P., N. Splett, and P. Barry. “Consistency of Credit Evaluations at Agricultural Banks.” 
Agribusiness 8(1992):517−536. 
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, and H. Lee. “A Nonparametric Approach to Expenditure-Constrained 
Profit Maximization.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72(1990):574−581. 
Färe, R., and D. Primont. Multi-Output Production and Duality: Theory and Applications, 
Boston: Kluwer, 1995. 
Farrell, M. “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
Series A: General 120(1957):253−281. 
28 
Fukuyama, H. “Scale Characterizations in a DEA Directional Technology Distance Function 
Framework.” European Journal of Operational Research 144(2003):108−127. 
Fuss, M., D. McFadden, and Y. Mundlak. “A Survey of Functional Forms in the Economic 
Analysis of Production.” In M. Fuss, and D. McFadden, ed. Production Economics: A Dual 
Approach to Theory and Applications, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978., pp. 
219−268. 
Hubbard, R. “Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment.” Journal of Economic Literature 
36(1998):193−225. 
Hubbard, G.R., and A.K. Kashyap. “Internal Net Worth and the Investment Process: An 
Application to U.S. Agriculture.” Journal of Political Economy 100(1992):506−534. 
Hughes, J.P. “Incorporating Risk into the Analysis of Production.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
27(1999):1−23. 
Hughes, J.P., W.W. Lang, L.J. Mester, and C.-G. Moon. “Efficient Banking under Interstate 
Branching.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 28(1996):1045−1071. 
Kalirajan, K.P. “An Analysis of Production Efficiency Differentials in the Philippines.” Applied 
Economics 23(1991):631−638. 
Kornai, J. “Resource–Constrained versus Demand–Constrained Systems.” Econometrica 
47(1979):801−819. 
Kornai, J. Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980. 
Lee, H., and R.G. Chambers. “Expenditure-Constraints and Profit Maximization in U.S. 
Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(1986):857−865. 
Liu, Z., and J. Zhuang. “Determinants of Technical Efficiency in Post-Collective Chinese 
Agriculture: Evidence from Farm-Level Data.” Journal of Comparative Economics 
28(2000):545−564. 
Luenberger, D.G. Microeconomic Theory. New York:McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1995. 
−−. “New Optimality Principles for Economic Efficiency and Equilibrium.” Journal of 
Optimization Theory and Applications 75(1992):221−264.  
Moro, D., and P. Sckokai. “Modelling the CAP Arable Crop Regime in Italy: Degree of 
Decoupling and Impact of Agenda 2000.” Cahiers d’Economie et Sociologie Rurale 
53(1999):49−73. 
Nasr, R.E., P.J. Barry, and P.N. Ellinger. “Financial Structure and Efficiency of Grain Farms.” 
Agricultural Finance Review 58(1998):33−48. 
29 
O’Neill, S., and A. Matthews. “Technical Efficiency in Irish Agriculture.” Economic and Social 
Review 32(2001):263−284. 
Oriade, C.A., and C.R. Dillon “Developments in Biophysical and Bioeconomic Simulation of 
Agricultural Systems: A Review.” Agricultural Economics 17(1997), 45−58. 
Petrick, M. “Empirical Measurement of Credit Rationing in Agriculture: A Methodological 
Survey”, Discussion Paper, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe, IAMO, Halle, 2003. 
Phimister, E. “Farm Household Production under CAP Reform: The Impact of Borrowing 
Restrictions.” Cahiers d’Economie et Sociologie Rurale 38(1996): 62−78. 
Pille, P., and J.C. Paradi. “Financial Performance Analysis of Ontario (Canada) Credit Unions: 
An Application of DEA in the Regulatory Environment.” European Journal of 
Operational Research 139(2002):339−350. 
Schaffer, M.E. “Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? A 
Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence.” Journal of Comparative Economics 
26(1998):80−103. 
Schiantarelli, F. “Financial Constraints and Investment: Methodological Issues and International 
Evidence.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12(1996):70−89. 
Shephard, R.W. Cost and Production Functions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. 
Tauer, L.W., and H.M. Kaiser. “Negative Milk Supply Response under Constrained Profit 
Maximizing Behavior.” Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
17(1988):111−117. 
Tauer, L.W., and Z. Stefanides. “Success in Maximizing Profits and Reasons for Profit Deviation 
on Dairy Farms.” Applied Economics 30(1998):151−156. 
Tulkens, H., and P. Vanden Eeckaut. “Non-parametric Efficiency, Progress and Regress Measures 
for Panel Data: Methodological Aspects.” European Journal of Operational Research 
80(1995):474−499. 
Valentini, L. “Credit Rationing and Capital Structure: A Survey of Empirical Studies.” Dept. of 
Economics. DP 9905, University of Southampton, 1999. 
Whittaker, G.W., and M.J. Morehart. “Measuring the Effect of Farm Financial Structure on 
Efficiency.” Agricultural Finance Review 51(1991):95−105. 
 
30 
Appendix 1. Duality between Short-Run Directional Distance and Variable Profit 
Functions 
Proof: a) First, consider the affine subspace defined by  { }
f f M N f v f x x R y x x x H = ∈ =
+ ; ) , , ( ) (.  
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and, utilising expression (8) the fixed costs terms cancel out and the result is obtained.  Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2. Distance Functions and Profit Functions: Computational Aspects 
This appendix briefly describes the mathematical programs that must be solved for each 
observation in the years 1995 to 2001 to compute the nonparametric specifications of the profit 
frontiers described in the main body of the text. We first define the standard profit functions, 
and then we specify the expenditure-constrained profit functions. For each of these cases we 
first treat the long-run case and only thereafter the short-run counterpart. 
The year 1994 drops out, since we need one year with lagged observations to formulate a 
lagged credit constraint based on observed expenditures in the preceding year. We develop the 
linear programs underneath for the most general specification, i.e., the intertemporal production 
technologies. This implies summing the technologies over the years 1995-2001. Notice that the 
year-by-year technologies are obtained by simply dropping the summation operator over the T 
time periods. When correcting for technical change in the intertemporal frontier, this amounts to 




kn y x ) of the mathematical programs using the 
technological change component of the Luenberger productivity indicator (see the main text). 
First, the intertemporal long-run total profit function is computed as: 
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Second, the intertemporal version short-run total profit function is:  
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Third, the intertemporal version of the expenditure-constrained long-run total profit 
function with a lagged credit constraint requires computing:  
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Fourth, the intertemporal version of the expenditure-constrained short-run total profit 
function with a lagged credit constraint can be calculated as follows: 
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Appendix 3. Additional Empirical Results  
This appendix with additional empirical results contains several parts. It strictly follows 
the order in which the complementary results are mentioned in the main text. First, it describes 
the evolution of inputs and outputs over time. Second, the impact of the three technologies (i.e., 
year by year frontiers, intertemporal frontier with and without correcting for technological 
change) on the efficiency decomposition is reported. Third, we report a nonparametric test 
statistic confirming that all efficiency scores, but the planning component, are significantly 
different from zero. Fourth, both short- and long-run financial efficiency is traced over time. 
Fifth, the evolution of the shadow prices is disaggregated over time. Finally, the effect of 
correcting for yield differences is analysed the Tobit analysis. 
Recall that the real annual growth rates of (i) total labour, (ii) surface area, (iii) 
operational expenses, (iv) immobilizations, and (v) sales are respectively 0.73%, 1.11%, 2.04%, 
4.97%, and 2.59%. Figure A3.1 plots the evolution of these inputs and outputs over time and 
adds a trend line to each series as well. In sequence, one finds a plot of the detailed evolution in 
the following series: (i) labour, (ii) surface area, (iii) operational expenses and immobilisations 
(on one figure to save some space), and (iv) sales. Notice that all inputs increase moderately 
over time, while sales suffer from a serious dip near the end of the period. 
 
Figure A3.1. Evolution of inputs and outputs and real average annual growth rates 































































Tables A3.1 and A3.2 contain the descriptive statistics for the short-run respectively the 
long-run efficiency scores for the three different specifications of technology. For these different 
specifications of technology, the short-run results indicate that mismanagement and technical 
problems explain most of the gap between the level of observed and maximal profits of farms. 
However, the financial constraints also have effects. For each year (except 1998 in the case of 
the year by year frontier), we observe that a large majority of farms are financially constrained. 
Turning to the long-run perspective, financial constraints are by far the main source of ill 
functioning. Limited access to financial resources explains between 40% and 60% of overall 
efficiency according to the technology specification. Actual inefficiencies remain substantial, 
but have now become secondary in importance. Just like in the short-run case, the long-run 
planning efficiency component is close to zero. Clearly, the average efficiency scores have 
about the same order and indicate common causes for the poor performance across technology 
specifications, though the relative importance differs in short- and long-run. 
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Table A3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Short-Run Efficiency Scores for Three Different 
Specifications of Technology 












1995 30.81% 22.18% 13.84% -5.21% 83.71%
1996 30.45% 23.41% 9.53% -2.48% 74.16%
1997 26.67% 20.77% 6.83% -0.93% 60.11%
1998 34.20% 29.94% 6.66% -2.40% 52.25%
1999 27.90% 25.12% 2.61% 0.17% 56.74%
2000 29.18% 20.55% 7.72% 0.91% 70.79%
2001 32.47% 21.74% 11.17% -0.44% 72.47%
Average 30.24%  23.39% 8.34% -1.48%  67.17%
Short-Run Efficiency Scores for an Intertemporal Frontier with Correction for Technological Change 










1995 44.2% 36.1% 9.5% -1.5% 78.7%
1996 42.5% 35.1% 9.6% -2.2% 79.8%
1997 35.9% 28.5% 6.9% 0.5% 70.2%
1998 46.8% 40.2% 11.7% -5.1% 87.1%
1999 42.3% 34.8% 6.2% 1.4% 70.2%
2000 39.5% 30.4% 7.3% 1.7% 66.3%
2001 40.7% 31.3% 8.4% 1.0% 69.7%
Average  41.7% 33.8% 8.5% -0.6% 74.6%












1995 46.1% 39.8% 10.8% -4.5% 77.0%
1996 43.3% 37.6% 8.9% -3.3% 69.1%
1997 44.2% 38.4% 6.1% -0.3% 65.2%
1998 39.5% 34.6% 6.2% -1.3% 64.0%
1999 41.6% 35.9% 5.2% 0.5% 59.6%
2000 42.0% 34.5% 6.0% 1.5% 56.7%
2001 48.6% 40.7% 8.0% -0.2% 62.4%
Average 43.6%  37.4% 7.3% -1.1%  64.8%
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Table A3.2. Descriptive Statistics of Long-Run Efficiency Scores for Three Different 
Specifications of Technology 












1995 72.9% 34.4% 40.7% -2.2%  98.3%
1996 72.6% 32.5% 41.5% -1.5%  100.0%
1997 74.0% 28.8% 46.2% -0.9%  99.9%
1998 78.1% 31.7% 48.3% -1.8%  99.8%
1999 76.7% 28.6% 49.1% -1.0%  100.0%
2000 79.1% 23.0% 55.4% 0.6%  99.8%
2001 82.7% 22.5% 60.4% -0.3%  99.8%
Average 76.6%  28.8% 48.8% -1.0%  99.7%












1995 82.3% 29.0% 52.4% 0.9%  98.9%
1996 80.8% 29.3% 53.3% -1.8%  100.0%
1997 77.0% 24.5% 51.5% 1.1%  98.9%
1998 81.2% 34.8% 52.6% -6.1%  99.4%
1999 78.8% 31.2% 46.4% 1.2%  98.3%
2000 77.5% 28.3% 47.6% 1.6%  97.8%
2001 78.9% 28.2% 49.2% 1.5%  98.3%
Average 79.5%  29.3% 50.4% -0.2%  98.8%












1995 85.49% 36.36% 51.47% -2.33%  98.88%
1996 83.45% 36.11% 49.14% -1.80%  100.00%
1997 83.02% 36.78% 47.34% -1.09%  98.31%
1998 78.15% 33.63% 46.25% -1.73%  98.88%
1999 79.73% 36.31% 44.52% -1.10%  98.88%
2000 80.92% 36.69% 43.42% 0.81%  97.75%
2001 84.94% 41.10% 44.24% -0.40%  98.31%
Average 82.24%  36.71% 46.62% -1.09%  98.72%
 
From now onwards, we restrict attention to the preferred year-by-year technology (see 
the arguments in the main text). Hence, we drop the two intertemporal specifications from the 
analysis.  
To save some space, table A3.3 only reports the results of the nonparametric sign test 
over the whole sample. For each of the short and long run efficiency scores reported in Table 2 
of the main text, we report the test statistic in the first line and the resulting p-value in the 
second line. A quick look at this table reveals that financial, actual and overall efficiencies are 
significantly different from zero. Only for the planning efficiency one cannot reject the 




Table A3.3. Sign Test Statistic of Efficiency Scores 
 Short-Run  Long-Run 

















Next, we trace short- and long-run financial efficiency over time while focusing on the 
eventual impact of either correcting the surface area for yield differences or not. In the main 
text, we reported results with the correction. Here we also report some results under the 
alternative assumption. Figure A.3.2 plots both short- and long-run financial efficiency over 
time with or without correcting the surface area. In both cases, short-run financial efficiency 
improves until 1999 to deteriorate again thereafter. By contrast, the long-run financial efficiency 
deteriorates continuously within our time period. Plausible partial explanations for this 
divergence between short- and long-run results are that (i) in the short-run average yields for 
wheat have augmented by about 20% between 1995 and 1999 and have decreased by 20% for 
the two last years, while (ii) in the long-run the prices of outputs relative to inputs have regularly 
diminished by about 10% over the whole period. 
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Figure A.3.2. Evolution of short- and long-run financial efficiency with or without 
correcting surface area by yields  

























Table A3.4 traces the evolution of the shadow prices over the years 1995 to 2001. There 
is quite some change from one year to another. But given the lack of detailed knowledge about 
the eventual changes in the credit policies of the banks involved and the existence of a whole 
41 
series of other potential influencing factors (e.g., the agricultural business cycle, climatic 
variations, etc.), it is probably prudent to conclude that the shadow price foregone due to credit 
constraint is substantial and probably above unity. The upward bias in our identification of 
potentially credit constrained farms (see also, the main text) is an additional argument for this 
prudent conclusion. 
 
Table A3.4. Average Shadow Prices per Year (1995-2001) 
 Short-run Long-run 
1995 1.1943  2.3454 
1996 1.2796  1.8680 
1997 1.1177  1.4374 
1998 2.0646  1.8123 
1999 1.5340  0.8817 
2000 1.1907  1.3165 
2001 1.0977  1.5272 
 
Table A.3.5 allows checking that the correction of surface area by yields does not modify 
our statistical analysis in any sense. Notice that the first two columns are identical to table 4 in 
the main text. Again the low p-values for the Wald test point at the significance of the specified 
models. The value of ρ confirms the relevance of employing a panel estimator. The panel Tobit 
model results reported are clearly robust between the two approaches. Hence, the correction of 
surface area for yield differences changes neither the sign nor the level of significance for any of 
the reported parameters explaining the financial efficiency scores. 
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Table A.3.5. Panel Data Tobit Regression Results for Financial Efficiency (With and 
Without Weighted Surface Area) 








































































































D1998   -0.0777006
(0.000) 






D1999   -0.1202487
(0.000) 










































ρ  0.302 0.526  0.320 0.505
P values are in parenthesis, ρ measures the relative contribution of the variance of individual specific error 
terms to the total variance of residuals; Wald test is Chi
2 with yit = xitB + ui + eit (H0: Bj=a vs. H1 : Bj ≠a). 
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